The maximum value that can be extracted from block production in excess of the standard block reward and gas fees by including, excluding, and changing the order of transactions in a block.

A trading strategy where a bot detects a large pending transaction and places its own transaction with a higher gas fee to get executed first, usually to buy a token before the price goes up.

A combination of front-running and back-running. The attacker buys before a victim's trade and sells immediately after, pocketing the price difference caused by the victim's slippage.

A research and development organization formed to mitigate the negative externalities of current MEV extraction techniques and avoid the existential risks MEV could cause to state-rich blockchains like Ethereum.

A communication channel that allows searchers to send transaction bundles directly to block builders/validators, bypassing the public mempool to avoid being front-run or having strategies simulated.

A collection of transactions grouped together and submitted to a block builder. Bundles are atomic, meaning either all transactions in the bundle are included in the block in the specific order, or none are.

The minimum gas price required to include a transaction in a block, determined by the protocol (EIP-1559). It is burned and not paid to validators.

An additional fee paid directly to the validator to incentivize them to prioritize your transaction over others.

An automated bot or entity that monitors the mempool for MEV opportunities and submits bundles to builders to capture that value.

A specialized actor that accepts bundles from searchers and constructs full blocks to maximize profit, which are then proposed by validators.

A "waiting room" for pending transactions that have been broadcast to the network but not yet included in a block.

The difference between the expected price of a trade and the price at which the trade is executed. MEV bots often exploit high slippage settings.

A strategy where a liquidity provider adds liquidity to a pool immediately before a large trade and removes it immediately after, capturing the trading fees.

Submitting a transaction immediately after a target transaction in the same block to capture price impact or arbitrage opportunities. Generally considered ethical and used by FRB Agent.

Closing under-collateralized lending positions on protocols like Aave or Compound to claim the liquidation bonus. A protocol-positive MEV strategy that maintains lending market health.

A group of transactions submitted atomically to Flashbots block builders. Either all transactions execute in the specified order or none do — eliminating partial-fill risk.

Solana's equivalent of Flashbots bundles, submitted via the Jito Block Engine. Enables atomic multi-transaction execution with tip-based prioritization on Solana.

Open-source middleware run by Ethereum validators that lets them outsource block construction to specialized builders, separating block proposing from block building (PBS).

A specialized actor in Ethereum's post-Merge architecture that constructs full blocks from searcher bundles and submits them to validators via MEV-Boost relays.

A network participant that proposes and attests to blocks. On Ethereum (post-Merge), validators stake 32 ETH and receive priority fees plus MEV-Boost rewards.

The percentage of submitted bundles that successfully land in a block. FRB Agent achieves ~94% inclusion on Ethereum via Flashbots and ~91% on Solana via Jito.

A bundle setting that prevents the transaction from being included if it would revert (fail). Saves gas on failed attempts. Available on Flashbots, Beaver, and Titan relays.

The shared queue of pending transactions visible to all nodes before block inclusion. Transactions here are vulnerable to sandwich attacks and front-running.

Ethereum's post-Merge architecture pattern where block proposing (validator) and block building (builder) are separated, enabling MEV-Boost's competitive marketplace.

A guarantee that a sequence of transactions either all succeed in the specified order or all fail together. Critical for arbitrage bundles where partial execution would create losses.

A small payment included in a Jito bundle to prioritize inclusion. Tips compete in real-time auctions; FRB Agent automatically optimizes tip size based on bundle expected value.

A bidding war on the public mempool where searchers escalate gas fees to outbid each other for the same opportunity. Wasteful — private bundles eliminate this entirely.

A scam token contract that prevents holders from selling. FRB Agent's policy engine includes a honeypot blocklist and runs simulation checks before any live trade.

Foundry's local Ethereum testnet that forks mainnet state in real-time. FRB Agent uses Anvil to simulate strategy logic before live execution.

A persistent bidirectional connection used by MEV bots to subscribe to real-time mempool events. Lower latency than HTTP polling; FRB Agent benchmarks WSS endpoints by region.

Single Unified Auction for Value Expression — Flashbots' decentralized chain for sequencing and MEV redistribution. Aims to standardize MEV markets across rollups.

Flashbots' user-facing protection program. Users' transactions are routed through a private orderflow auction; users receive a portion of the MEV their trade generates.

When a builder rebates a portion of MEV revenue back to the searcher whose transaction generated it. FRB Agent surfaces realized refunds in its Ops Pulse telemetry.

A software model where the user retains exclusive control of private keys. FRB Agent is non-custodial — keys never leave the user's machine and the publisher cannot access funds.